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Although it features in many historical accounts, the Quebec Act too often remains 
on the sidelines. National narratives – which most often structure historical writing 
– highlight other foundational events instead. Quebec and Canadian history both 
make La Conquête a central turning point: the conquest of 1759–60, when New 
France fell, and landed (providentially or tragically, depending on one’s perspective) 
in the British Empire. In Native American history, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
stands as a milestone: indigenous resistance to British power resulting in the creation 
of a Native American territory off limits to European settlement, establishing land 
and treaty rights that would persist into the present. The United States, meanwhile, 
dates its foundation from 1776, the year when settler resistance to British power 
culminated in a Declaration of Independence and a war for nationhood. As for the 
British Empire, 1783 marks the date at which the first empire ended and the second 
began. Even the events of 1812 have recently joined the mix, now reframed as “the 
fight for Canada” waged by the nation’s three founding peoples, French, English, and 
Native American. In these and other narratives, the Quebec Act of 1774 plays a bit 
part – if it plays any at all.1  
 
Thus does the Quebec Act fall through the scholarly cracks. (The last sustained 
analysis of the Act is now thirty years old.2) And yet today, more than ever, there are 
good reasons to question its marginality. Recent attempts to approach history from 
transnational perspectives offer an opportunity to reinterpret the Quebec Act across 
these and other historiographical boundaries. The growing practice of entangling 
histories – histoire croisée, as the French term puts it – enables a reconsideration of 
the Quebec Act from Canadian, North American, Native American, and British 
imperial perspectives.3 This volume has two principal objectives. First, it brings 
cuttingedge methodological, geographical, and thematic perspectives to bear on the 
Quebec Act. Moving beyond a national frame, this book highlights the multi-faceted 
importance of an event whose significance, we hope to demonstrate, is greater than 
the sum of its many fractured historiographical parts. By resituating the Act in light 
of the last generation of scholarship, we also point to new directions for future 
research. Second, by focusing on one event – a social, legal, revolutionary, and 
imperial phenomenon that crosses multiple national, social, and historiographical 
borders – this volume makes a methodological contribution. Operating at multiple 
scales of spatial analysis and juxtaposing multiple historical perspectives, this book 
hopes to serve as a case study in the practice of “entangling” conceptually distinct 
historical fields. In this regard, our volume joins recent scholarship that has been 
showing the interconnectedness of national histories and, indeed, methodological 
approaches, from legal to cultural, political to religious, and beyond. This introduction 
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first traces the historiography on the Quebec Act from multiple national perspectives 
that have framed the scholarship. From there, it offers a brief overview of the 
essential historical contexts – Canadian, Native American, and imperial – that 
situate our renewed understanding of the Act, before introducing the individual 
essays. 
 
A FRACTURED HISTORIOGRAPHY  
 
Varied interpretations of the Quebec Act reflect divergent opinions of colonial society 
and British imperialism in North America. Not surprisingly, some of the richest 
analyses originate in Canada. Nationalist Quebec historians, critical of British power, 
portray the Act as a purely tactical concession made to Canadiens to secure their 
loyalty during a troubled period. A second view, by contrast, describes it as a charter 
to safeguard French-Canadian distinctiveness within the empire, and laying the 
foundation for a multi-ethnic political space. According to a third line of argument, 
the Act was an unfortunate attack on, and ultimately a barrier to, the development 
of political and economic liberalism in Canada. In contrast to the extended debate 
Canadian scholarship accords the Quebec Act, us historiography – still disentangling 
itself from a reading of colonial America that leads inevitably to revolution – has 
marginalized it. Most often the Act is relegated to one of the “Coercive” or 
“Intolerable” acts that led to the American Revolution. The historiography on the 
British Empire, meanwhile, reads the Quebec Act as the product of a complicated set 
of local and imperial interactions. In that tradition’s most ambitious interpretations, 
the Quebec Act emerges as a first step in the reformulation of the Second British 
Empire. A brief survey of these varied scholarly traditions will help lay the 
groundwork for this volume’s methodological and interpretive intervention. Quebec 
resident William Smith published the first study of the period in 1815. Disturbed by 
even the limited persistence of a French civilization he considered inferior, Smith 
portrayed the Quebec Act as the unfortunate result of lobbying by Franco-Catholic 
elites. By exploiting a favourable political context – the imperial crisis of the 1770s – 
they secured the Canadien population’s loyalty to the British Crown. Their success, 
however, came at a high cost: preserving feudalism in the St Lawrence Valley.4 The 
first French-Canadian historians interpreted the political culture of the St Lawrence 
Valley very differently. The regime established by the Constitutional Act of 1791 gave 
little autonomy to the colonial assembly. The resulting political dynamic pitted the 
elected representatives of an essentially Franco-Catholic population against a 
government dominated by Anglo-Protestants, leading to a growing cleavage of politics 
along ethnic lines.5 These tensions erupted in crisis in 1837 and 1838, culminating in 
armed insurrections justified by republican ideals, which elicited a ruthless 
repression and a temporary return to the constitutional authoritarianism of 1774. In 
1840, a new constitution further diluted the influence of the French-speaking 
population within a new assembly made subordinate to heavy-handed imperial 
authorities. In this context of imperial domination, French-Canadian interpretations 
of the Quebec Act began to take shape. François-Xavier Garneau, who published his 
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ambitious History of Canada in three volumes starting in 1845, saw the Act as an 
early moment in a continuous struggle for Canadien liberty that stretched back to 
the fall of the French Empire. Abandoned by France and humiliated by the English, 
Canadiens found themselves treated “like a barbarian nation without government 
and without laws,” while authorities in London sought to “denationalize the country” 
and “repeat in Canada what had been done in Ireland.” From this perspective, the 
Quebec Act foreshadowed a long battle of future generations to free themselves of 
foreign domination and forge their own nation.6 Building on this interpretation in the 
1920s, Lionel Groulx cast the Conquest as a catastrophic event that opened the way 
to a “policy of assimilation.” For this dominant figure among Quebec historians, the 
Quebec Act was an insignificant concession that bought the support of a small 
aristocratic and clerical elite in anticipation of conflict with the Thirteen Colonies. 
The 1774 constitution gave a risibly small amount of power to “a minority kept on a 
short leash.”7 Neo-nationalist historians at the Université de Montréal further 
developed this line of argument after the Second World War, interpreting the 
Conquest as the beginning of the political and economic subjugation of French 
Canadians. Excluded from the military service that underpinned its dignity, the 
Canadien gentry humiliated itself by slavishly supporting the conquerors in exchange 
for a few sparingly distributed honours. In this analysis, the Quebec Act did nothing 
to improve the Canadiens’ situation. To the contrary, a “social decapitation” ensured 
that they remained a subjugated people, without any control over their destiny.8 
Michel Bibaud (1792–1857) and like-minded historians came to a very different view 
of the Quebec Act.9 Bibaud, a French-Canadian monarchist, did not link the Act to 
agitation in the Thirteen Colonies. Rather, he presented it as the product of careful 
reflection by imperial authorities concerned with the effective administration of 
Canada, and more sensitive to the interests of the Canadiens than to the English 
merchant lobby. Likewise, Tomas Chapais dismissed the role of the impending 
American Revolution in the Act’s origins. In his 1919 study, this loyalist Catholic 
historian, worried about the dissolution of the British Empire in the wake of the First 
World War, described it as “liberating and reconstructive legislation” that advanced 
“our religious emancipation and our national emancipation.”10 Anglo-Canadian 
historiography of the twentieth century removed the Quebec Act from the imperial 
context, casting it as an initial step in the creation of a binational Canada founded on 
mutual respect between two separate peoples. Alfred Leroy Burt’s 1933 study argued 
that the Quebec Act advanced the equal rights of two distinct peoples, making it 
possible for them to coexist within a supranational political framework. While this 
liberal approach did not extend to other parts of Britain’s multi-ethnic empire, Burt 
believed it was appropriate for Canada, because “the French possessed a civilization 
as ancient and as fixed as that of the English.”11 In his Colony to Nation: A History 
of Canada (1946), Arthur Lower agreed. The Act, he argued, was “a great 
constitutional land-mark in Canadian history and the history of the British Empire.” 
It lay the foundation for a Canada defined by the improbable marriage of two opposed 
world views, ensuring the survival of an older, premodern French-Canadian 
mentality, which would henceforth temper the excessively individualistic and 
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industrious mentality of English Canadians.12 A fairly narrow interpretative 
framework, which reflected debates among national elites, thus constrained 
interpretations of the Quebec Act. In the 1960s, Fernand Ouellet broke new ground. 
A practitioner of socio-economic history and a follower of the French Annales school, 
Ouellet focused on the emergence of a dynamic merchant bourgeoisie between 1760 
and 1774. That bourgeoisie, he argued, remained too small to serve as a reliable ally 
to London. To consolidate their authority, imperial officials thus turned to the only 
viable alternative: the landed gentry. Determined to deconstruct ethnic 
understandings of the Quebec Act, Ouellet abandoned “the famous themes of the 
‘struggle for survival,’” blaming a “reactionary nobility, as much enamored of political 
absolutism and social inequality as in the past,” for the future struggles of Quebec 
society.13 Hilda Neatby similarly avoided analyzing the 1774 constitution in terms of 
anachronistic Canadian nationalisms. Unlike Ouellet, however, she located the 
Quebec Act firmly within a British imperial framework. Imperial authorities were 
not trying to guarantee the fundamental rights of a Franco-Catholic population, she 
argued, nor were they looking south to the thirteen rebellious colonies. Rather, they 
hoped to solve the problem of instability in the Ohio Valley and provide for the 
efficient administration of the Province of Quebec.14 In the 1970s, Pierre Tousignant 
made an incisive contribution to the study of the Quebec Act by exploring a vast 
corpus of official documents, both colonial and imperial. Fusing social, political, 
strategic, diplomatic, economic, and cultural perspectives, he placed the Quebec Act 
in a far broader context than any previous historian, casting it as both the product 
and the manifestation of a shift in imperial policy that followed the failure of Lord 
Halifax’s continental strategy.15 Granted, the centralizing and authoritarian turn in 
imperial policy had been under way for several decades, as testified to by events in 
the Thirteen Colonies.16 He insisted that the adoption of the Act on 22 June 1774, 
had to be understood in the context of the Massachusetts Government Act, passed 
one month earlier. Rather than seeing the Act as an ad-hoc response to local 
circumstances, however, he argued that it resulted from a long set of deliberations by 
officials in London. No historiography of equivalent richness on the Quebec Act exists 
in the us-based scholarship, where the American Revolution exerts an almost 
irresistible gravitational pull on the events of the 1770s. Framed in the context of us 
national history, the Quebec Act nearly always gets subsumed within the so-called 
“Intolerable” or “Coercive” acts that pushed British settlers towards independence. 
This perspective has made it impossible to understand the Quebec Act on its own 
terms: as legislation of national or transnational significance. Coming right after the 
Boston Tea Party and two years before the American Declaration of Independence, 
the Quebec Act becomes but one more step in the teleological coming of the 
Revolution. Nineteenth-century us historians framed the Quebec Act in reference to 
the tensions between the Thirteen Colonies and the empire. “In the belief that the 
loyalty of its possessions had been promoted by a dread of French settlements on their 
northern and western frontier,” wrote George Bancroft, the foremost national 
historian of the nineteenth- century United States, “Britain sought to create under 
its own auspices a distinct empire, suited to coerce her original colonies, and restrain 
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them from aspiring to independence. For this end it united into one province the 
territory of Canada, together with all the country northwest of the Ohio to the head 
of Lake Superior and the Mississippi, and consolidated all authority over this 
boundless region in the hands of the executive power.”17 Francis Parkman, 
unremittingly fascinated with French colonial history in North America, did manage 
to escape the national framework. His brief mention of the Act suggested, however, 
that he less successfully escaped the prejudices of his Protestant background. “Civil 
liberty was given them by the British sword,” Parkman wrote at the conclusion of his 
great Montcalm and Wolfe, in an analysis that echoed that of William Smith’s 1815 
study, “but the conqueror left their religious system untouched, and through it they 
have imposed upon themselves a weight of ecclesiastical tutelage that finds few 
equals in the most Catholic countries of Europe.”18 That the Quebec Act bore 
intrinsically on the American Revolutionary fervour by its annihilation of the 
Thirteen Colonies’ all-important western land claims seems to have eluded most 
historians interested in the subject. Even Thomas Perkins Abertheny’s still useful 
account of the importance of western lands to the American Revolution barely 
mentioned the Act.19 
Bancroft’s perspective – understanding the Quebec Act in relation to the 
American Revolution – has continued in the modern scholarship on colonial politics 
of the 1770s, which inevitably looks forward to the American Revolution. “Because of 
its timing and provisions, the Quebec Act was also considered by the colonists to be a 
part of this punitive legislation,” notes one essay on the Coercive Acts in the Blackwell 
Companion to the American Revolution, edited by Jack P. Greene and John R. Pole. 
“In fact the Act was an enlightened effort on the part of the British Government to 
organize the recently acquired colony of Quebec.”20 Most modern accounts don’t even 
bother to make the distinction, simply lumping the Quebec Act in as part of the 
Coercive Acts.21 In his study of political culture that explicitly shies away from a 
teleological reading of the thirteen mainland colonies, Brendan McConville points to 
the Quebec Act as “a particularly lurid example of what awaited the American 
colonists under the new, militarized tyranny.” McConville thus explores the Act as 
the final nail in the coffin of a Protestant political culture that had built itself around 
the cult of a benevolent monarch to dominate the colonies for more than a century. 
“To provincials, it looked like the establishment of popish government in full bloom 
right on their doorsteps.”22 One recent study gives greater attention to the Quebec 
Act, providing an insightful analysis grounded in the politics of the St Lawrence 
Valley and emphasizing the Act’s effects on religious and territorial issues, thus 
offering an essential context for the Act’s reception in the lower Thirteen Colonies. 
Nonetheless, the analysis ultimately remains in the service of explaining the 
American Revolution, as suggested by the title of the work, The Battle for the 
Fourteenth Colony.23 The major exception to the Revolution-centric analysis of the 
Quebec Act in us scholarship lies in Native American history, which occasionally 
examines the Quebec Act in the light of contested sovereignties in the Ohio Valley. 
Even then, however, the transfer of the Ohio Valley to the Province of Quebec has 
seemed like the most transient of events in the long-contested extension of us 
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settlement into the continental interior. The Ohio Valley became part of Quebec only 
six months before fighting broke out in Lexington, Massachusetts. Almost 
immediately, the region became a war zone, as it had been for decades. Indeed, 
fighting continued in the Ohio Valley after Yorktown, after it had ceased in other 
parts of the continent, growing in 1782, 1783, and even into 1784, as Shawnee and 
Iroquois warriors battled forces led by George Rogers Clark. The sudden and 
dramatic cession of what would soon be called the Northwest Territory in the 
“Infamous treaty” of 1783 means that Quebec’s extension into the Ohio Valley was 
fleeting in theory and never realized in practice; for that reason, it is largely seen as 
the briefest of moments in a long war for control of the trans–Appalachian West. Not 
surprisingly, in a historiography that emphasizes Native agency and resistance 
against settler pressures, attention to imperial laws tends to get overlooked in favour 
of social dynamics on the imperial periphery. The attention of historians thus shifts 
to the next stage of that war, in the 1780s and 1790s, when the newly formed Ohio 
Confederacy resisted us encroachment north of the Ohio River.24  
It is from the perspective of British imperial history that the Quebec Act has 
been most fruitfully explored in English-language scholarship. The notable figure 
here is Clarence Walworth Alvord (1868–1928), who studied at Amherst College and 
the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin, eventually earning his PhD from the 
University of Illinois. Building on the scholarship of his contemporaries in the 
“Imperial School” of historians, such as Charles McClean Andrews (1863–1943) and 
Herbert Levi Osgood (1855–1918) – and, like his contemporaries, firmly grounded in 
the British archives – Alvord pushed the politics of the British Empire deep into the 
North American continent. “Whenever the British ministers soberly and seriously 
discussed the American problem,” his influential The Mississippi Valley in British 
Politics began, “the vital phase to them was not the disturbances of the ‘madding 
crowd’ of Boston and New York but the development of that vast transmontane region 
that was acquired in 1763 by the Treaty of Paris.”25 Jack Sosin’s Whitehall in the 
Wilderness, published in 1961, built on Alvord’s insights to show how the Quebec Act 
resulted from a series of repeated failures of British policy in the continental interior. 
Sosin particularly emphasized the importance of maintaining peace with Native 
peoples west of the Appalachians.26 British imperial scholarship on the Quebec Act 
fell into rapid decline after Canada and the other dominions of the Empire gained 
autonomy in the 1930s; Reginald Coupland, a historian of imperialism, published the 
last major work in 1932.27 Coupland believed in the superiority of British imperial 
governance, which sheltered inferior cultures under its benevolent protection. From 
this premise, the skilful and liberal management of French Canada’s cultural 
distinctiveness in 1774 exemplified British generosity and toleration; it could serve 
as a model for latter-day British authorities managing the transition to a 
commonwealth of nations. Coupland’s confidence in the Empire’s benevolent 
capacities could not outlast the Second World War and the violent upheavals of 
decolonization.28 However, attempts to interpret the Quebec Act in the context of 
British imperial politics continued. In 1961, Peter D. Marshall emphasized “the 
significance of the Quebec example in establishing the constitutional form of the 
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Second British Empire,” raising the question not just of the consequences for Quebec 
of its incorporation into the British Empire, but of “the effect upon the British Empire 
of its incorporation of Quebec.”29 Philip Lawson, a historian trained in the United 
Kingdom and living in Alberta, launched a renewed imperial perspective in 1989. In 
his masterful work, based on an intensive study of the official archives, as well as of 
British public opinion, Lawson interpreted the debates surrounding Quebec as a 
defining moment in British history, locating them in the context of late-eighteenth-
century ideologies on identity and the nature of citizenship.30 On the one hand, 
Lawson highlighted the problem posed by the Canadiens’ Catholicism. On the other 
hand, he explored how the cultural diversification of Britain’s colonial possessions 
after the Seven Years’ War affected ideas of citizenship – not necessarily in the 
Empire at large, but in the British Isles in particular.31 By asking “what effect the 
conquest of Quebec had on Britain” – a question that seems obvious in the current 
post-colonial historiographical context but which, in the 1980s, was truly pioneering 
– Lawson opened a path that several essays in this book have followed.32 David 
Milobar continued that tradition in a series of articles published in the 1990s, reading 
the political debates surrounding the Quebec Act through the rich scholarship on 
“Country” ideology burgeoning at the time, and setting them in “the context of 
broader intellectual traditions that underpinned the eighteenthcentury British 
Atlantic.”33 He concluded that the Quebec reforms “constitute a historical barometer 
of the most sensitive issues within the British Atlantic empire.”34 In recent decades, 
post-colonial studies have reinvigorated the field of imperial history, resulting in 
important work that pushes beyond stodgy accounts of benevolent administrators in 
the metropole to emphasize the mutual interrelation of centres and peripheries, the 
interaction among a variety of state and non-state actors, and the centrality of 
cultural practices and imperial subjectivities to the construction of empire. Several of 
the essays in the volume follow on the magisterial work of P.J. Marshall, who 
emphasizes the interrelated nature of the Empire in the Americas and South Asia, 
and whose research on Quebec takes a more global approach than any other.35 Taken 
together, the scholarship on the Quebec Act emerges as one divided not just by nation 
but also by scale of analysis. Whether set at provincial, continental, Atlantic, or global 
levels, the insights from these rich and varied approaches have too often remained 
siloed. Recent historiographical developments now make it possible to consider the 
Quebec Act from a fresh set of perspectives.  
 
THE CONQUEST OF NEW FRANCE: IMPERIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ST 
LAWRENCE VALLEY  
 
It was from the mundane process of governance in the St Lawrence Valley that a new 
vision for British imperial governance would eventually emerge. When negotiations 
between France and Britain opened in 1761 after the collapse of France’s North 
American Empire, a hawkish William Pitt envisaged a “punitive peace” that would 
strip France of its colonies.36 French negotiators, meanwhile, intended to recover 
Canada, which they considered the key to their American possessions.37 If British 
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diplomats soon pared back their demands – the country’s shrewder negotiators 
recognizing that humiliating a defeated power only plants the seeds of future wars – 
they remained unbending on the issue of Canada. The war, after all, had stemmed 
from the French military presence in North America, and the British were 
determined to remove that cause for good. They therefore decided to return French 
possessions in the Caribbean in exchange for the withdrawal of French troops in 
Europe. As François-Joseph Ruggiu has shown, France and Britain each reversed its 
colonial policy in the Treaty of Paris negotiations.38 Where the French had long 
pursued imperial, territorial, and military dominance, they would henceforth focus 
on commercial and economic profitability. Britain, by contrast, expanded territorially 
and bureaucratically; it found itself burdened with a collection of new colonies that 
had cost dearly to acquire, whose administration promised to be expensive, and whose 
profitability remained uncertain. The exhilaration of military victory soon gave way 
to a drearier process of imperial governance. British authorities seem to have 
assumed that, after the Conquest of New France, Britain would simply impose its 
laws on the occupied territories. General Jeffrey Amherst flatly rejected any 
protections of “the Laws and usages” of New France in the 1760 Articles of 
Capitulation of Montreal. French-Canadians were to “become Subjects of the King,” 
by which Amherst meant that they would become subject to English law.39 The same 
assimilationist vision prevailed in London, where authorities hoped to establish more 
rational and uniform policies across their vast new empire. The Royal Proclamation 
of 1763 created four new colonies – Quebec, West Florida, East Florida, and Grenada 
– to be peopled, it was assumed, by Protestants accustomed to living under English 
law. At the same time, it forbade settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains, 
reserving the territory for Native Americans, and centralized authority for treaty-
making with the imperial government. But what to do about the existing population 
in the meantime? Although the Treaty of Paris gave residents of the St Lawrence 
Valley the option of leaving for metropolitan France, very few did so.40 Members of 
the military nobility faced doubtful prospects in France: their titles were often 
uncertain, their futures in the French military cloudy, and no one knew if or how the 
wealth built in Canada could be transferred to France. In Canada, they were firmly 
rooted by entrenched trade networks, and especially by the socio-economic power they 
wielded as landowners. Unsurprisingly, most chose to stay in Canada. The 
prosperous communities of Canadien merchants in Quebec and Montreal made the 
same calculation and arrived at the same decision. Among the elite, only the members 
of the civil administration emigrated in significant numbers. As for the artisans and 
peasants, they remained firmly attached to the society into which they had been born. 
The colonists of French ancestry in the St Lawrence Valley, with their growing sense 
of collective identity,41 posed an obvious threat to British sovereignty.42 The Acadian 
experience seemed to confirm the worst British fears. After its territory was ceded to 
Britain in 1713, the French-speaking Catholic population had resisted submission to 
British authority, refusing to take up arms against the French during the Seven 
Years’ War. To British officials, the Acadians exemplified a conquered people’s 
tendency to treason.43 Although deportation was ultimately used against the 
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Acadians, such a measure does not appear to have been considered in the Canadien 
case.44 Instead, officials in London set out to assimilate the inhabitants of the St 
Lawrence Valley. Some believed that the Canadiens, finally liberated from the 
oppression of Bourbon absolutism and irresistibly attracted to enlightened English 
governance, would gratefully transform themselves into Anglo-Protestants.45 More 
sober analysts, however, counted on the large-scale immigration of Anglo-Protestant 
settlers to neutralize the Canadien influence. In pursuit of this goal, the Board of 
Trade, led by the Anglo-Irish proprietor, Wills Hill, 1st Earl of Hillsborough, 
implemented policies to attract Protestant migrants to the new territories by keeping 
them out of the trans-Appalachian West. “The aim,” writes Bernard Bailyn, “was a 
slow and controlled expansion of western settlement and the gradual introduction of 
civil government in the west.” A 1763 Board of Trade memorandum outlined the steps 
needed to implement the policy in Quebec: Establish a capital named “British Town,” 
to be settled by new migrants, who would bring with them “the English language, the 
English manners, & a Spirit of Industry, among the French Canadians.” This 
assimilationist vision prevailed in the early stages of drafting the Quebec Act, with 
authorities assuming that French law would eventually give way to British law.46 It 
was not long, however, before British imperial control ran up against realities on the 
ground. Within several years, the demographic and political situation in the St 
Lawrence Valley (and elsewhere in the empire) had made itself manifest. Aside from 
a small but notable cohort of Scottish merchants, waves of Anglo-Protestant 
migration were not flooding into Quebec. Meanwhile, the Canadiens retained a firm 
hold on the lands bordering the St Lawrence River. Officials in London had no choice 
but to deal with them.47“Whatever might have been intended in 1763,” P.J. Marshall 
aptly remarks, “accommodations with the huge French majority could not be 
avoided.”48 These necessary accommodations would eventually give rise to a form of 
imperial governance more open to cultural and religious diversity and more firm in 
curbing colonial autonomy. Although no one would have recognized it at the time, the 
roots of a form of imperial governance stretched back to the 1760 Articles of 
Capitulation of Montreal. Articles 27, 39, and 40 provided for the free exercise of 
Catholicism, and promised residents, both Aboriginal and European, that they would 
not be relocated by force, while article 37 guaranteed property rights to existing 
residents.49 Although these agreements were meant only as temporary measures, by 
guaranteeing property rights, in particular, the terms of surrender maintained the 
seigneurial regime, a social order dominated by the military aristocracy, the landed 
gentry, and the Catholic Church.50 From the first conquest, then, reassuring the 
Canadien elites was the highest priority of the “military regime” (1760–1763).51 The 
civil government established by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 maintained these 
priorities and policies. Although some of the document’s provisions restricted the 
rights of Catholics on paper, colonial administrators’ need for local expertise meant 
that most of the discriminatory measures banning Catholics from public office were 
not put into practice.52 From these early accommodations grew a vision of the St 
Lawrence Valley’s integration into the British Empire that would not depend on 
Canadiens’ embrace of English liberty, but would rely, instead, on their attachment 
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to the land itself, and to the seigneurial system that supported their social structure. 
As Heather Welland has pointed out, for many British officials the peculiarities of 
Canadian society (its Catholicism and its feudal regime) created an opportunity for 
more effective governance rather than an aberration that needed to be eliminated.53 
This view was especially prevalent among those neo-Tories who favoured a more 
centralized empire, with each colony dependent on the mother country, rather than 
a wider and more decentralized imperial commercial network. In the eyes of such 
observers, Canada’s hierarchical institutions gave it the characteristics of an ancien 
régime French province they construed as an archetypal feudal society.54 Because 
this view of the social order served their authoritarian political vision, the first two 
governors of the province placed particular emphasis on the Catholic, rural, and 
aristocratic character of Canada. A large part of subsequent Canadian historiography 
would retrospectively paint a portrait of Quebec that conformed to this initial (and 
tactical) portrayal: of an exotic peasant society, endowed with all the qualities of 
simplicity, subject to the cycles of nature and the rites of a medieval Church, frozen 
in time and consequently incapable of governing itself.55 The problem with this view 
of Canada is that it did not conform to the existing social order. In Quebec and 
Montreal, prosperous families of merchants and artisans formed an educated petite 
bourgeoisie that offered its services to the state.56 These literate Canadiens largely 
ensured the operation of the colonial administration after the departure of the French 
civil administrators. They also embodied a Frenchspeaking public opinion, as 
revealed in debates surrounding the drafting of the Quebec Act. Far from it being the 
sole prerogative of a minority of radical British colonists, French-speaking Canadians 
also demanded political autonomy, mobilizing a discourse of liberty very early on, and 
shaping it in dialogue with their English-speaking counterparts.57 But these elements 
of the political culture along the St Lawrence Valley served no useful political end in 
the debates in London leading up to the Quebec Act. Thus, the discursive construction 
of “Canadiens” as a homogenous and feudal people clinging to an aristocratic form of 
government reduced the province’s population to two groups whose characteristics 
and interests were diametrically opposed: the good Canadiens, frozen in time and 
submissively waiting for an opportunity to be constitutionally protected by the 
Empire, and a nasty group of radical English merchants attempting to seize power 
for their own benefit. Ensuring the participation of Canadiens in the political and 
administrative structures of the colony required more than mere accommodation of 
the principles of cultural and religious toleration. It required an institutional 
recognition of the Catholic Church itself – no easy feat in the immediate wake of a 
bitter global struggle waged under the banner of an apocalyptic struggle between 
Protestant freedom and Popish slavery. Local authorities proceeded cautiously. 
Although abolished in principle, the collection of the tithe (which provided for the 
subsistence of the clergy in New France) was maintained in practice.58 Similarly, the 
network of Catholic parishes inherited from New France remained. The Privy Council 
received numerous opinions on the religious question, and was particularly attentive 
to the views of the Canadien gentry. In February 1763, Joseph-Marie de la Corne, a 
Canadien aristocrat, experienced diplomat, and representative of the high clergy, 
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contacted Lord Shelburne with a plan for establishing a Canadian Catholic Church 
that would be loyal to the king.59 The British military commander in Quebec had 
similar ideas, hoping to encourage the development of a Catholic and French-
speaking society in Quebec. In June 1765, jurists submitted a report to the Board of 
Trade urging that Canadiens “not [be] subject to the incapacities, disabilities, and 
penalties to which Roman Catholics in this kingdom are subject by the Laws 
thereof.”60 According to Philip Lawson, this was the moment when officials in London 
definitively abandoned the vision of a Protestant Quebec.61 It represented a turning 
point in the history of British imperial governance and of the principle of religious 
tolerance. On 29 June 1766, Mgr Jean-Olivier Briand triumphally disembarked at 
Quebec as the new Catholic bishop.62 The Church had become the authorities’ 
preferred representative of the Canadien people. And thanks to a particularly 
efficient system of cultural and moral regulation, the clergy had become the main 
guarantor of Canadiens’ loyalty, a fact that had a lasting impact on the collective 
consciousness of Quebec.63 In a remarkably short time, imperial administrators had 
concluded that Canada’s bedrock institutions were not to be disrupted and could even 
be reinforced to better ensure the province’s loyalty. Still, they needed to persuade 
the British parliament. That task was given to the experts who, between 1766 and 
1774, developed and drafted what would become the Quebec Act. The Earl of 
Shelburne, in charge of American affairs, placed particular emphasis on Great 
Britain’s responsibility to recognize certain rights of the peoples it conquered. When 
Guy Carleton replaced James Murray as governor of Canada in 1766, adherents to 
ideologies of Anglo-Protestant supremacy expected a return to policies of forced 
assimilation. Those hopes were soon dashed, however: the new governor continued 
his predecessor’s policies, ignoring the demands of British merchants and 
establishing closer ties to the “traditional” Franco-Catholic elites. He also extended 
the authority of the Court of Common Pleas, a tribunal that operated largely in 
French and according to principles of French law. During the months of May and 
June 1774, the British parliament debated a bill confirming the perpetuation of the 
social, legal, economic, administrative, cultural, and territorial frameworks that 
Canada had inherited from the French regime. It was the subject of particularly 
stormy arguments in the House of Commons. Combining anti-Catholic prejudice with 
an alarmist defence of the Bill of Rights (1688), the popular English press sought to 
turn public opinion against the proposal. In response, the government delegated 
Carleton, a key architect of the plan, to defend the bill in parliament. He did so 
brilliantly. An Act for Making More Effectual Provision for the Government of the 
Province of Quebec in North America (14 Geo. III, c. 83) was approved by a large 
majority (fifty-six for and twenty against) in the Commons on 18 June 1774, and 
received royal assent four days later. The Quebec Act came into force on 1 May 1775. 
In the absence of an elected colonial assembly, the governor would be assisted by a 
nominated legislative council. As it happened, all the Catholic councillors were 




THE OHIO VALLEY AND NATIVE AMERICAN ALLIES 
 
To understand the Quebec Act as a result of ten years of struggle between French 
Catholics, Protestant settlers, and imperial administrators, however, leaves out some 
of the most essential features – and actors – in its construction. Perhaps because 
scholars tend to project the modern-day borders of Quebec back in time, too little 
research on the Act has looked south to the Ohio Valley and west to the Great Lakes. 
The Quebec Act was not passed just to appease settlers along the St Lawrence Valley, 
after all; its reach stretched deep into the Ohio Valley and across the pays d’en haut, 
where it reinforced a set of concessions to Native Americans that dated back to the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763. Whatever the lines and colours on European maps 
proclaimed, Great Britain had not extended its sovereignty into Indian Country after 
the Seven Years’ War. Just as early plans to assimilate or overwhelm the French-
Canadian population in Quebec collapsed in the early 1760s, so British policies in the 
trans-Appalachian West dissolved amidst the fierce resistance of the inhabitants. 
Native peoples long allied with French power and linked to New France through 
kinship, trade, and diplomatic networks had not, after all, capitulated in Montreal or 
surrendered alongside Montcalm. “Although you have conquered the French,” 
warned an Ojibwa chief to a British trader, “you have not yet conquered us!” In 1763, 
Native peoples allied under the Ottawa chief Pontiac launched a series of devastating 
assaults on British forts and settlements. The vast uprising across the Great Lakes 
and the Ohio Valley panicked British imperial officials with the prospect of a costly 
new war coming hard on the heels of their recent victory. The resulting concessions 
to Native nations, enshrined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, created the Province 
of Quebec, and laid down a set of principles intended to protect Native landholdings, 
centralize trade and diplomacy with imperial officials rather than fractious provincial 
governments, ban colonial settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains, and 
ensure that future Native cessions only occurred by treaty with the central 
government. This policy focused particularly on the Ohio Valley, where the settler- 
Native-imperial tensions were at their most intense. By the late eighteenth century, 
wars for control of the region had been waging for centuries. Britain was a relative 
newcomer. If the St Lawrence Valley was a world of European settlements, with 
habitants living on fixed seigneuries, the Ohio Valley looked entirely different: a fluid, 
highly mobile, and decentralized Native world, where British sovereignty remained 
exceedingly tenuous. A robust trade continued in the Illinois Country, on the western 
edge of the Ohio Valley. Meanwhile, to the south, the French governor of Louisiana 
was reaching out to Cherokees, Choctaws, Abekas, Alibamos, and others to 
consolidate French alliances as late as 1762. “If the British wished to occupy the 
French posts and establish a trade with the western nations,” as Michael A. 
McDonnell has remarked, “they would have to do so on Indian terms.”64 Only by 
strengthening their own networks of Native alliances could British officials 
effectively assert their sovereignty in the region. The oldest and most important of 
British allies were the Haudenosaunee, centred along the Mohawk Valley, and the 
Cherokee, centred along the Tennessee River. Since these two groups of Iroquoian- 
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speaking people controlled two major waterways into the Ohio Valley, alliances with 
them in north and south became the key to British control of the region. Confronted 
with common enemies in the Illinois Country and around the Great Lakes, the 
Haudenosaunee and Cherokees finally established an uneasy peace.65 It wasn’t just 
Native American politics in the Ohio Valley that were exceedingly decentralized. So 
too were the settler politics of the British Empire. Both proved baffling to British 
imperial administrators seeking to establish sovereignty in the continental interior. 
In response to Iroquois and Cherokee demands, authorities continually promised, in 
vain, to keep white settlement out of Indian Country. Meanwhile, colonial 
governments undermined imperial authority by negotiating separate land cessions 
with Indians and granting vast tracts of land to well-connected speculators, while 
hundreds of settlers heedlessly flouted treaty obligations to settle on Indian lands. 
“You often tell us we don’t restrain our people, and that you do so with yours,” an 
Iroquois delegate chastised Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Johnson. And 
yet, he pointed out, “your Words differ more from your Actions than ours do.” By the 
early 1770s, the Ohio Valley was a war zone among various Native people and 
between settlers invading the country and Indians fighting to retain their 
sovereignty. In response to the chaos, one solution beckoned: the imperial 
government would consolidate its authority in more reliable hands than those of 
colonial governments and uncontrollable settlers. New borders would be drawn, not 
along the crest of the Appalachians, as in the 1763 Royal Proclamation, but rather 
following the massive cession of Iroquois (formerly Alongonquian) lands in the 1768 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix and of Cherokee rights in the 1768 Treaty of Hard Labour, 
both of which pushed the eastern border of Indian Country to the Ohio River. The 
Quebec Act was thus the result of more than a decade of attempts to consolidate 
British authority in the Ohio Valley by strengthening Indian control and 
discouraging settler incursions. At stake was the fate of British authority in the West 
– and, in a sense, the fruits of the great victory achieved in the Seven Years’ War. 
The new province built on previous French travel routes connecting the Ohio and the 
St Lawrence valleys, reorienting trade and governance away from the seaboard 
colonies to the east, and signalling the centrality of Native-French-Métis trade 
networks over those of British settlers. Both the geographical and legal features were 
written, as Undersecretary of State for the Colonies William Knox put it, “for the 
avowed purpose of excluding all further settlement” in the Ohio Valley.66 Colonial 
officials believed that preventing the extension of British law into Indian Country 
would further discourage Anglo-Protestant settlement. As Edmund Burke, a fierce 
critic of the law, complained, it would “draw a line which is to separate a man from 
the right of an Englishman.” For its proponents, this was a feature, not a bug, of the 
new policy. Just as earlier officials had believed British law in Quebec would attract 
Protestant settlers, so, by the same logic, they now believed that maintaining French 
law in the trans-Appalachian West would keep settlers out. Proponents of the Quebec 
Act were clear about their intentions. “If it is not wished that British subjects should 
settle that country,” wrote Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
“nothing can more effectually tend to discourage” British settlement than 
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maintaining French law in the Ohio Valley. It was a point on which both proponents 
and opponents of the policy could agree. For opposition Whig Charles Pratt, 1st Earl 
of Camden, a fierce critic of the act, the Quebec Act would serve as “an eternal barrier 
... [a] Chinese wall, against the further extension of civil liberty and the Protestant 
religion.”67 Eternal it was not to be, however. Only a year after the Quebec Act was 
passed, British settlers in New England were in armed insurrection against the 
British Empire. By 1783, Lord Shelburne – a strong supporter of the Quebec Act – 
would agree to cede the Ohio Valley back to the seaboard colonists. Its history as part 
of Quebec was vanishingly short, and it is thus tempting to view it as an anomaly. 
Nonetheless, some of the elements embedded in the Act persisted. Most notably, the 
principle that treaty-making power be centralized and not ceded to the individual 
states was enshrined in the 1787 United States Constitution. On the other hand, the 
United States would endorse some of the principles articulated by the Quebec Act’s 
opponents. When the us Congress began to organize the Northwest Territory in the 
1780s, it did so in the expectation that regular government in the region would foster 
settlement. Indeed, as Christian Burset notes in this volume, the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 “essentially codified the compromise the Act’s opponents had 
offered, allowing preserving French property law for French inhabitants, but 
imposing British common law for civil procedure.” If British common law had failed 
to extend to Quebec in the 1770s, it ultimately succeeded in doing so in the United 
States in the 1780s. The ironies remain striking, even today: it was Great Britain 
that extended French law into the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes in the 1770s, and the 
United States that would extend British law into the same region in the 1780s.  
 
EXPANSION OF EMPIRE 
 
The significance of the Quebec Act was not limited to the history of the St Lawrence 
or Ohio valleys, however. In its broadest frame, the Act was more than a Canadian, 
or even a North American, event: it was a British imperial event, which resulted from 
a radically expanded empire confronting a demographic, legal, religious, and cultural 
diversity unprecedented in its history. The territories conquered by Britain in the 
Seven Years’ War extended far beyond the borders of current-day Quebec. They 
spanned the St Lawrence River, into the Great Lakes, and north to Hudson Bay to 
encompass most of today’s Canada. From there, they stretched south across the trans-
Appalachian West to the Gulf of Mexico, including Florida (East and West), and 
across the Gulf to the Caribbean Sea, including the stretch of the Windward Islands 
in the Caribbean from Martinique to St Lucia, St Vincent, and Grenada. The scale of 
these new American possessions would have been daunting enough, but still they 
were only a fraction of the new territories won in the war. From the Caribbean, 
Britain’s vastly expanded empire stretched across the Atlantic to the slave-trading 
colony of Saint-Louis and into Senegal, through the Mediterranean to Gibraltar and 
Minorca, and then, most consequentially of all, encompassed extensive sections of the 
Indian subcontinent, including the state of Bengal, with a population far exceeding 
any other European colonial possession.68 An island nation, controlling a maritime 
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space, had suddenly become a territorial empire. Britain’s American territories alone 
stretched across half a billion acres of land, making up only one part of a global 
empire that now encompassed millions of peoples of vastly differing languages, 
religions, manners, and legal codes. Each new region was deeply faction-ridden, with 
quarrelling populations – European and indigenous; slave and free; French, Spanish, 
and English; Hindu, Muslim, and Christian – including most notably Britain’s “old 
subjects,” all of them with conflicting political objectives. Each new territory, 
moreover, had a varied set of hopelessly muddled legal traditions to sort through. An 
innumerable number of assertions of local authority now confronted attempts at a 
more centralized, imperial authority. There simply was no precedent for managing a 
polyglot British Empire on this scale.69 In North America, General Jeffery Amherst 
had taken the first stab in the wake of the French defeat, but his assertive policies 
had failed in Quebec and across the trans-Appalachian West. The following decade, 
similarly assertive policies inspired rebellion among Caribs in St Vincent. 
Meanwhile, governments in the imperial centre were rising and falling, Bengal was 
starving, and British colonists in the thirteen seaboard colonies were proving 
themselves immune to even the mildest imperial regulations. Indeed, from that last 
perspective it was hardly obvious that imposing Protestant religion and English 
manners would unify or pacify distant populations. After all, the very opposite was 
just then taking place among the largely English and Protestant colonies to the south 
of the St Lawrence Valley. Given the chaotic political context, offering concessions to 
a population of French Catholics beckoned as the most obvious way to negotiate the 
conflicting claims of local versus imperial control. What began as a response to forces 
on the ground and contingent factors elsewhere, however, soon became enmeshed in 
broader debates about imperial governance and about the nature of empire itself. As 
British officials searched for precedents in crafting a new imperial policy, they found 
few places to turn. The tiny Mediterranean island of Minorca appeared recurrently 
in the discussions surrounding the Quebec Act (as it does in this volume). There, 
Britain had taken possession of the island earlier in the eighteenth century and 
preserved Spanish language and law. The Caribbean island of Grenada, also acquired 
in the Seven Years’ War, served as another example. There, the British were finding 
ways to accommodate the French-Catholic settler population. And, of course, the Irish 
case was of central importance, looming over much of the debate.70 But the Quebec 
Act pointed to something fundamentally new, reflecting the new scope of the British 
Empire. “The scale of the problem,” as P.J. Marshall observes, had “suddenly become 
vastly greater.” Old, homogenizing approaches grounded in a common religion and 
manners were not just impractical; they began to seem downright tyrannical. When 
one Member of Parliament claimed, in the debates surrounding the Quebec Act, that 
imposing English laws on a conquered nation was an “act of the grossest and 
absurdest and cruelest tyranny,” it signalled how far opinion had moved in just one 
generation. Even the “Mussulman, the Ottoman, the Turks, the worst of all 
conquerors, in the countries they subdued,” declared Solicitor General Alexander 
Wedderburn, “left the people in possession of their municipal laws.” This new line of 
thought revealed an openness to a legally and religiously diverse empire that stood 
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in stark contrast to the traditional definition of a militantly Protestant British 
imperial nationalism. It suggested that Britons and their conquered peoples had 
suddenly entered a moment of rich, profound, and fundamentally original reflection 
on the nature of the British Empire specifically and of empire more generally. From 
this reflection, as Hannah Muller puts it in this volume, “a new vision of governance” 
would arise, and it is in this broader imperial context that the Quebec Act of 1774 
emerges as an important turning point: the moment “when a truly imperial 
subjecthood was imagined and realized.” With its acceptance of legal, cultural, and 
religious pluralism within the empire, the Quebec Act inaugurated new debates about 
imperial authority and administration, the thematic contours of which would persist 
through much of the next century. Although it was hardly uncontested, the Quebec 
Act of 1774 marked a decisive turn away from a conception of the British Empire as, 
in David Armitage’s pithy formulation, “Protestant, commercial, maritime and free.” 
From a longer-term perspective, historians may want to consider the possibility that 
the second British Empire began not so much with the loss of the American colonies 
in 1783, but rather in 1774, with the foundation of the conceptual bases for a new 
empire.71 As this volume emphasizes, this new vision of imperial governance resulted 
from a host of factors operating at different political and geographical scales, and 
from the complex negotiations between local struggles on the imperial periphery and 
officials in the metropolitan centre. The debate pushed beyond the practicalities of 
imperial governance to address the meaning of British subjecthood itself, both in the 
colonies and in the metropole – debates that paralleled the more famous ones taking 
place just to Quebec’s south. Imperial innovations on this scale were bound to foster 
dissent. After all, not everyone agreed that British subjecthood should be so fluid, and 
legal systems so flexible. Protestant English-speaking settlers across North America 
saw their empire being pulled out from under their feet. Indeed, from a broader 
imperial perspective, the American Revolution and the collapse of the first British 
Empire emerges more as a consequence than a cause of these debates over imperial 
governance. Whatever the context in which the Quebec Act is located – be it us, 
Canadian, Indigenous, or imperial – the event, as we hope this volume shows, was of 
greater importance than any single body of scholarship recognizes. In this regard, a 
study of the Quebec Act offers a fruitful example of the methodological payoff of an 
“entangled” approach to history, highlighting the interconnected nature of early 
modern history more generally. Like the proverbial butterfly flapping its wings, a 
small Act could have a variety of unanticipated and unintended consequences bearing 
on a variety of interconnected peoples of North America and the British Empire, each 
of them redounding on the other to determine the course of so many interconnected 
histories. 
 
THE VOLUME  
 
Part I of the volume, “Quebec, Law, and Empire,” lays out the broadest geographical 
context for the Quebec Act, setting it principally in the scholarship on law and empire. 
Hannah Muller begins by presenting the stakes of the debate from an imperial 
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perspective. The Quebec Act, she argues, did not simply lay out a new vision for 
governing the empire; it was also a fundamental redefinition of British subjecthood. 
Before the Seven Years’ War, little consensus existed on the precise rights of British 
subjects. Most writers simply referred back to a vaguely defined ancient constitution. 
Old and New Subjects agreed that British subjects were protected by law. But which 
law? Canadiens paved new ground by arguing that British subjecthood required the 
preservation of French civil law, which would “render them more able to serve their 
monarch as loyal subjects.” The argument was taken up in London by figures like 
Solicitor General Alexander Wedderburn, who insisted that the Quebec Act would 
“bring the Canadians much more to the resemblance of British subjects than they are 
at present.” Old Subjects, by contrast, argued that British subjecthood required the 
preservation of English law. For them, the Act was, as William Pitt put it, “the most 
cruel, oppressive and odious measure” that would alienate many subjects. Crucially, 
these new meanings of subjecthood resulted directly from the debates playing 
themselves out on the ground in Quebec. From periphery to centre and out again, 
debates in Quebec launched “a profound redefinition of the rights of British subjects” 
– not just in Canada but throughout the British Empire – resulting, for the first time, 
in “a truly imperial subjecthood.” Donald Fyson’s essay serves as an essential 
counterpoint to the imperial and transnational approach that animates the other 
contributions in this volume. It brings attention to the local practice of administrative 
power rather than to imperial discourse, and to the concrete consequences of the 
Quebec Act on Franco-Catholic settlers. Fyson argues robustly against portrayals of 
the Quebec Act as a Magna Carta of a nation in the making. For him, it was 
essentially the constitutional ratification of a series of pragmatic policies undertaken 
by governors – the same pragmatic response that had already inspired many of the 
articles of the Capitulation of Montreal (1760) and the Treaty of Paris (1763). More 
fundamentally, Fyson demonstrates that religious, legal, and judicial policies had 
been imposed on the ground by the Canadiens themselves, and were implicitly 
recognized by colonial rulers as an effective form of social regulation. The Quebec Act 
therefore cannot be considered as the founding moment of Canadiens’ political 
identity within the Empire; it was merely the official recognition of a state of affairs 
based on mutual accommodation that had gradually emerged in previous years. This 
reading the Quebec Act’s marginal consequences on the daily lives of old settlers 
nonetheless highlights its historical importance. By its constitutional ratification, it 
emerges as a manifestation of considerable evolution in theorizations of empire 
during the period, and as proof of the integration of a predominantly French and 
Catholic colony in this evolution. If the Quebec Act was thus the response to forces on 
the ground, and in this sense the product of highly contingent factors, there was 
nothing impulsive about the new policy. Michel Morin shows that the Quebec Act was 
not ad hoc, but resulted from the detailed study of French legal codes, extensive 
consultation with jurists, and careful deliberation among policy officials. 
Reconstructing the debates and controversies in Quebec and in London, Morin follows 
legal officials as they drafted reports on the implementation of British law in 
conquered territories. No longer were they proposing legal accommodations as 
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temporary measures. By the late 1760s, influential voices began to push back, not 
just against the practicality, but against the very principle of a legally uniform British 
Empire. The “British Form of government, never will produce the same Fruits as at 
Home,” Governor Carleton wrote Lord Shelburne in 1768. “It is impossible for the 
Dignity of the Throne to be represented in the American Forests.” The 
implementation of legal uniformity in an empire now spanning an unprecedented 
variety of climates, peoples, and manners made little sense, according to these 
theorists. It was, Attorney General Edward Thurlow argued in a 1773 report, both 
“unattainable” and “useless.”72 Christain Burset brings a broad coherence to the 
various pro – and anti – Quebec Act voices, reading the debate through the lens of 
the scholarship on legal pluralism, and arguing that the dispute over the Quebec Act 
was part of a “broader debate over the place of English law in the British Empire,” 
notably including Bengal. Until the second half of the eighteenth century, Burset 
argues here, British imperial policy followed Edward Coke’s dictum that a “union of 
lawes is the best meanes for the unity of countries.” Imperial administrators followed 
this principle in imposing English law on Ireland, Wales, as well as conquests abroad 
like New York. Some diversity existed within the law, to be sure, but advocates of 
legal pluralism remained marginal through the middle of the eighteenth century. It 
was only after the Seven Years’ War that a loosely organized movement that Burset 
identifies as “authoritarian Whigs” began to cohere. These figures – who included 
Wedderburn, Carleton, and Chief Justice William Murray, 1st Earl of Mansfield – 
abandoned the traditional pursuit of legal uniformity in favour of a new commitment 
to legal pluralism, which they believed would allow Britain to more efficiently govern 
its colonies, while maintaining them in a state of economic subordination. The 
authoritarian Whigs were opposed by a coalition of radical Whigs, who saw the 
lurking threat of governmental tyranny in the efforts to limit the universality of 
English common law, and establishment Whigs, who were willing to compromise on 
some elements of legal pluralism but insisted that English commercial and 
procedural law should govern the colonies. The vision of the authoritarian Whig 
ultimately won out. Their conception of legal pluralism imposed across the Empire 
amounted to a major break with past practice and would affect all realms of the 
British Empire going forward. “From 1774,” Burset concludes, “the question would 
no longer be whether to embrace mandatory legal pluralism, but how.”73 Part II, 
“Religious and Ethnic Conflict,” moves beyond the legal and administrative 
frameworks of the first four essays to explore the controversial religious aspects of 
the law. After all, the Quebec Act was “not solely an example of legal pluralism or 
negotiated authority,” as Aaron Willis notes in his essay. It also served “as a critical 
example of religious and cultural pluralism within British imperial civil society.” 
Willis reconstructs the debates that led to the Quebec Act’s formulation, showing the 
powerful influence of what many officials by then considered the failed Irish 
experience on the discussions. “The reappraisal of the Catholic question in Ireland,” 
Willis argues, prompted “a rethinking of policy in the ceded territories in North 
America.” As they debated how to manage a new Catholic population, polemicists and 
policy-makers looked back to past experience and found it wanting. What, they asked, 
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had gone wrong in Ireland? “In a country so highly favoured by nature,” read a 1770 
pamphlet published in London, “the inhabitants could not be miserable, without some 
defect in our laws.” The parliamentary debates over the Quebec Act repeatedly 
referred to the Irish experience, where, as supporters of the Act pointed out, the penal 
laws had proven counterproductive, leading to the impoverishment of the Catholic 
population, pushing them toward rebellion, requiring the continual presence of 
(expensive) British garrisons, and driving them to cling with ever greater tenacity to 
the Catholic Church. Irish laws, wrote William Knox, the Irish-born under-secretary 
for the American department, who served under Hillsborough at the Board of Trade, 
had not “served in any degree to recommend them for our imitation in Quebec.” 
Indeed, several of the officials promoting a more pluralist model for Quebec – 
including Carleton and Knox – were themselves Irish born. Their experiences in 
Ireland gave them good reason to doubt the efficacy of an assimilationist approach to 
imperial governance. Central to their redesigned model of imperial governance was 
an emphasis on the seigneurs, whose loyalty and collaboration was seen as essential 
in maintaining imperial control over the larger population of Canadiens. This new 
emphasis on pluralism through concession to local elites amounted to a paradigm 
shift. “The Quebec Act was not simply a localized, pragmatic policy,” Willis concludes. 
“Experiments in Quebec would lay the foundation of collaborative strategies deployed 
across the British Empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” By breaking 
radically with the Empire’s past treatment of Catholics, the Quebec Act pointed 
toward a new policy of religious pluralism abroad – and at home. Luca Codignola 
paints a striking portrait of ecclesiastical networks stretching across the new and old 
territories of the British Empire, connecting authorities in Rome to Quebec, London, 
Grenada, Majorca, Florida, and Newfoundland; officials in older parts of the Empire, 
such as Ireland; as well as a related-but-distinct Jesuit network linking London and 
the North American British colonies (later the United States). Initially, Church 
authorities in London, led by an aging vicar apostolic, showed little interest in the 
formulation of the Act. That indifference is ironic, because, in the end, Codignola 
argues, the Act would play a significant role in English Catholic history – and, 
perhaps more importantly, in situating London at the heart of Catholicism in the 
British Empire. By the 1820s, London’s vicar apostolic had become the centre of a 
Catholic network spanning the globe from America to the East Indies, and the Pacific. 
From this longer temporal perspective, the Quebec Act emerges as an important step 
in the creation of the modern British Catholic Church. It shaped precedent not just 
for the governance of empire, but of the metropole too, foreshadowing Catholic 
emancipation and the transformation of the Church’s place in British life. The Quebec 
Act also played a decisive role in the construction of the Canadian Catholic Church. 
Traditionally Gallican, it gradually redefined the nature of its relations with the 
colonial authorities and established closer relations with the Holy See, thus gaining 
an unprecedented level of autonomy from the state. The negotiations surrounding the 
status of Catholicism in Quebec also mark an important step in the Vatican’s 
consideration of North American churches. Codignola’s text, which is based on a 
thorough and rare knowledge of religious archives, offers fascinating insight into an 
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aspect of Quebec and Church history neglected by the scholarship on the period. It is 
impossible to understand the caution with which the British Catholic Church and the 
imperial government inched towards religious tolerance without assessing the 
centrality of a militant Protestant patriotism in the British imperial identity. Brad 
A. Jones provides a striking illustration in his analysis of the Quebec Act’s reception 
in the New York and Halifax press. He shows how the Act catalyzed latent but 
powerful anti-Catholic strains in British political culture, fuelling an extreme 
paranoia about a Catholic plot and even a Catholic invasion. Recall that, by 1774, not 
even a century had passed since King James II had been overthrown in the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. The event was about as far from peoples’ living memory then as 
the Great Depression of the 1930s is to us today. A plot to secretly restore Catholicism 
might not have seemed so far-fetched as many historians now view it.74 Little wonder 
Protestants in New York and New England – where a language of Popery had long 
featured in the political discourse and where bitter memories of the French and 
Native attacks on British settlements remained vivid – were so quick to react 
violently. The timing of the Quebec Act – promulgated just as imperial tensions 
reached a boiling point – could hardly have been worse. “What,” asked one New 
Yorker, could have led officials to pass a bill meant “to rob, enslave and murder their 
fellow subjects at the expense of the protestant cause?” So powerful were anti-
Catholic sentiments, they could even shake settlers’ faith in “Popish King George” 
himself, who “had broken his coronation oath, and established the popish religion in 
Canada.” Well before Thomas Paine published Common Sense, pushing reluctant 
colonists to break with their monarchical political culture, Jones argues that the 
Quebec Act’s concessions to French Catholics had “brought the King to the centre of 
the conflict,” forcing colonists “to think more seriously about the place of the monarch 
in popular articulations of Protestant British patriotism.” Part III, “Aboriginal 
Nations and European Borders,” looks away from the Atlantic littoral to focus on the 
Ohio Valley, and on the essential role of Native peoples in the Quebec Act. As Jeffers 
Lennox emphasizes, anti-Catholic sentiments were not the only factors shaping the 
Quebec Act’s reception. “The Act’s ‘intolerable’ element was not the accommodations 
in offered French subjects,” he argues, “but rather the borders it provided for the 
province.” Perhaps because so few contemporary maps represented Quebec’s contours 
as laid out by the 1774 Act – the mostly patriotic printers in Great Britain found it 
difficult to represent an empire divided against itself – the implications of its 
extension into the Ohio Valley have gone largely unrecognized by historians since. 
For Lennox, the Act’s most salient feature was the size of the province it created, 
stretching from the St Lawrence Valley down the Ohio River and up around the Great 
Lakes. In so doing, it nullified the territorial claims that British settlers had only 
recently secured. Even worse, perhaps, by centralizing authority over land cessions 
in the Ohio Valley in Quebec, it reinforced the principle that British settlers would 
not push into Native territory without the permission of imperial authorities. “The 
people here,” as Frederick Haldimand wrote from New York, “do not want to see a 
chain pulled along the backs of their settlements.” Settlers may have protested, but 
Lennox shows that those borders were very intentional – the product of extensive 
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reflection and debate among colonial administrators. Although they possessed little 
geographic knowledge of the North American interior, authorities in London were 
well aware of the settler-Native dynamics that prevailed. William Johnson, among 
others, had relayed the unhappiness of Indigenous nations demanding, in the words 
of one Huron diplomat, that “we may be supported in the right and privileges granted 
us by our present Royal Sovereign and father by his proclamation of 7th October 
1763.” Governments along the coast had proven unwilling to enforce the borders of 
1763. A new government in Quebec might prove more successful. British officials in 
London spent extensive time debating Quebec’s new borders, but they would have to 
be imposed on the ground. And as Kristofer Ray argues, those cartographical 
boundaries “meant little in a fluid world, where Northern, Western, and Southern 
Indians interacted and competed with one another.” The Ohio Valley was “an 
Indigenous world,” Ray emphasizes, that “Britons simply could not control” – a world 
of “geopolitical fluidity” marked by extensive Native mobility, the creation and 
collapse of alliances, and almost continuous warfare. British power barely extended 
to the region; insofar as it did, it probably worked through alliance with Native 
American nations. Ray dwells partly on the various Cherokee tribes in the south, 
along the Tennessee River, and the Haudenosaunee to the north, both of whom had 
long-standing claims to parts of the Ohio Valley. Although these two Iroquoian-
speaking peoples had fought bitterly for decades, both were simultaneously at war 
with Western nations in the Illinois Valley and around the Great Lakes. By the mid 
1760s, the Ohio Valley had become the tense meeting point between all these warring 
people. Thanks to their common wars with Western nations (Aninshnaabeg, Illinois, 
Mascoutens, Miamis, and others), the British had succeeded in brokering a peace 
between the Cherokee and Haudenosaunee in the late 1760s. Alas, these long-
standing and expensive efforts to stabilize the West were continually undermined by 
rapacious British settlers and venal provincial governments. Imperial authorities 
were well aware of the “fraudulent and bad Practices” that prevailed. “I have heard 
of those Complaints as long as I have heared [sic] of America,” General Gage reported. 
Through these and other channels, officials in London were well aware that the 
“Thirteen seaboard colonies were utterly ill- equipped to deal with the palpable 
instability of Native affairs.” It had become clear that “only centralized power could 
stabilize the west and bring order to the North American Empire” by managing trade 
and diplomacy with Native Americans. The Quebec Act thus emerges, in Ray’s telling, 
as a belated attempt to stabilize a chaotic region, and fulfill the promises made in 
1763. Had it come earlier, perhaps it would have succeeded. It might seem odd to 
view the Quebec Act as an extension of the Royal Proclamation. On its face, the Act 
reorganized much of the territory encompassed by the Royal Proclamation, and was 
entirely silent on Native American issues. Did it overturn the rights established in 
1763? The question is not just, so to speak, academic; it carries major implications for 
current legal debates about Indigenous land rights in Canada. Although the 1774 Act 
figures in the lineage of laws that compose Canada’s unwritten Constitution, when it 
comes to the history of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, as Alain Beaulieu explains, it is 
the 1763 Royal Proclamation that takes on a canonical status. Alongside it, the 
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Quebec Act plays a minimal – and indeed embarrassing – role. While the 1763 
Proclamation asserted Indigenous land rights and established the precedent that 
Native lands could only be ceded by treaty, the Quebec Act failed to mention Native 
peoples, overturning the more generous Royal Proclamation. Nevertheless, as 
Beaulieu argues, there are good reasons to see the 1774 Quebec Act as an extension 
of the 1763 Royal Proclamation. Indeed, it was an extension of earlier French imperial 
policy in North America. By the 1770s, British officials had become convinced of the 
“superiority of French Indian policy” enacted through a complex set of Native 
alliances. So effective were they, according to William Johnson, that even after the 
collapse of the French Empire, French people in the West “maintain their Influence, 
enjoy the major part of the Trade, whilst our Traders are considered as Interlopers.”75 
By centralizing Native American relations under a single governor in Quebec, the 
imperial government hoped to better manage their new system of alliances stretching 
into the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes and the treaties that undergirded them. 
Enforcing treaty requirement would appease Indian nations, while also asserting a 
firmer control over unruly British settlers.  
From these discussions, the role of Native American relations with European 
empires emerges as one of the key factors shaping the Quebec Act. And here one final 
irony becomes clear: the centralized authority over Indian affairs the Act meant to 
implement – and which was so vociferously rejected by rebellious settlers along the 
Atlantic coast – would remain in the Constitution those same settlers enacted in 
1787. By then, those colonists rebelling against an empire had become an imperial 
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